# On Its Tenth Day, the Serious Crimes Investigation Agency Is Idle… 459 Cases Referred by Police, ‘Zero’ Investigated

> URL: https://www.cityhorror.wiki/en/%EC%A4%91%EC%88%98%EC%B2%AD%EC%97%90-%EC%86%90%EA%B8%80%EC%94%A8%EB%A1%9C-%EB%93%A4%EC%96%B4%EC%98%A4%EB%8A%94-%EA%B3%A0%EC%86%8C%EC%9E%A5
> Estimated date: Oct 2026
> Last updated: 2026-10-28
> Korean original: https://www.cityhorror.wiki/%EC%A4%91%EC%88%98%EC%B2%AD%EC%97%90-%EC%86%90%EA%B8%80%EC%94%A8%EB%A1%9C-%EB%93%A4%EC%96%B4%EC%98%A4%EB%8A%94-%EA%B3%A0%EC%86%8C%EC%9E%A5

## Overview

Reports that the Central Investigative Agency (CIA), which was established on October 2, 2026, alongside the abolition of the Prosecution Service, had not built its own Criminal Justice Information System (KICS) and was handling many duties—including receiving complaints and writing investigation records—by hand sparked controversy over handwritten complaints being submitted to the agency.

On October 12, the tenth day after its opening, the Korea Economic Daily reported on the situation under the subheading “Complaints are being accepted in handwriting.” A screenshot of the article was posted on FM Korea under the title “The CIA after the abolition of the Prosecution Service.” The article also said that the police had notified the CIA of 459 cases, but that the CIA had taken over none of them. The agency’s reliance on handwritten procedures was cited as evidence that it was effectively “open but idle.”

## A Hasty Launch

The roots of the problems had been pointed out even before the agency opened. On its opening day, the Hankyoreh reported that the CIA was making a “hasty launch” amid understaffing, an unfinalized organizational structure, and inadequate infrastructure, while the heads of the Ministry of Justice, the Public Prosecution Office, the CIA, and the National Police Agency were all absent. As of the day before opening, 1,962 people had applied for special appointments, only about 68% of the authorized staff of 2,874. Among senior investigators in grades 1–5, only 212 applied for 629 authorized positions. As the appointment process for Kim Ji-yong, the nominee for the first CIA chief, was delayed, these senior investigators received their appointments at short notice the day before opening, without the chief’s recommendation. Some prosecutors and investigators reportedly learned their work locations only the day before the agency opened.

The condition of the buildings was similar. The building in central Seoul’s Jung-gu district, Le Nez Square, which houses the headquarters and the Seoul office, had floors 2 through 17 leased, but only six floors were available for use when the agency opened. The headquarters also had no holding cells for suspects. Yonhap News reported that the CIA began operations with 1,900 employees, or 66.1% of its authorized staff. According to the Seoul Shinmun, 16 of the headquarters’ 24 director-level positions were vacant, while 11 of the 25 director positions at the Seoul CIA were unfilled. Some offices reportedly had computer monitors but no computer towers, and a display in the building lobby still read “Trial operation.”

## Work Done by Hand

These staffing and facility shortages, compounded by system problems, have forced the agency to handle work across the board by hand. Unable to build its own KICS, the CIA is borrowing the police’s system, but for now can use only essential functions such as receiving transferred cases, registering cases, and assigning them. Case-processing and Criminal Justice Information Portal functions will not be available until the second phase of KICS launches in December. Until then, investigation records, their transmission, and logbook entries must all be handled manually. Building a dedicated KICS for the CIA is expected to take around three years.

The effects have spread to many aspects of investigative work. The Korea Economic Daily reported that there are numerous cases of complaints and other documents being processed by hand. The Seoul Shinmun reported that records of immigration and emigration, which investigators could previously check easily through KICS, must now be obtained in writing by sending an official letter to the Ministry of Justice. One investigator said, “There is no way investigations won’t be delayed,” and the Seoul Shinmun noted that checks on whether suspects have left the country, as well as emergency travel bans, could be delayed. For electronic approvals and email, the agency uses the Ministry of the Interior and Safety’s Onnara system; for messaging, it uses PC KakaoTalk or its internal messenger, Ontalk. A considerable number of investigators reportedly have not even received work computers.

There are also budget problems. The CIA has no expenditure account in its own name and has not been allocated a budget, so investigators reportedly often pay for supplies out of pocket and seek reimbursement afterward. The Seoul Shinmun reported that this means investigators would have to pay personal expenses even when going out to conduct a search and seizure. According to Yonhap News, an investigator at the headquarters said, “There’s hardly anything we can do because the infrastructure is inadequate, and the work hasn’t been clearly defined either. We keep holding meetings, but nothing is moving forward.”

## 459 Notifications, No Case Transfers

Cases continued to accumulate while the intake process was being handled by hand. According to records obtained from the National Police Agency by the office of Kim Ye-ji, a People Power Party member of the National Assembly’s Public Administration and Security Committee, the police notified the CIA of 459 cases between October 2 and 10. The Seoul Regional CIA received the most, with 205 cases, followed by Busan with 99, Suwon with 76, Daegu with 38, Gwangju with 25, and Daejeon with 16. Under the CIA Act, if the police become aware during an investigation of one of the seven major crimes under the CIA’s jurisdiction—corruption, economic crimes, defense-industry crimes, narcotics, national-security crimes, cybercrimes, and law-related distortions—they must immediately notify the chief. If the CIA requests a case transfer, the police must comply unless there is a justifiable reason not to.

However, as of October 8, the CIA had requested no case transfers and had taken over no cases. More than 30 complaints and accusations were submitted directly to the CIA on its first day alone, and the number received by regional CIA offices nationwide had reached 82 as of October 7. The CIA has assigned these cases to the relevant departments for document review, but has not yet been able to begin actual investigations because of the inadequate infrastructure. Representative Kim said, “If notifications of cases from the police do not lead to actual CIA investigations, it is difficult to say that the system is functioning properly,” and argued that the entire process, from notification to transfer and the start of an investigation, must be reviewed.

Jurisdictional issues also remain. The Korea Economic Daily predicted that confusion would be inevitable for some time, even after the CIA was ready to operate, because the committee tasked with resolving jurisdictional disputes with other investigative agencies, including the police, would not begin operating until February next year. A cyberattack involving AI systems at a financial institution is a case in point. The police consider the affected financial institution itself not to be a national critical infrastructure facility, but have asked the Financial Services Commission for an authoritative interpretation of whether the compromised system qualifies as an electronic financial infrastructure facility. The Seoul CIA is also reviewing whether the incident falls within its investigative jurisdiction.

## Internal Discipline and the First Inspection

As criticism mounted, the CIA moved to tighten internal discipline. According to the Seoul Shinmun, it issued a notice titled “Guidance on Maintaining Public-Service Discipline and Responding to the Media,” setting out rules on conduct, working hours, and confidentiality. The stated concern was that problems could worsen if incidents involving staff arose while public criticism of the agency’s inadequate preparations remained high.

The first exercise of the CIA’s oversight authority was not an investigation but an inspection. On October 11, Minister of the Interior and Safety Yoon Ho-jung ordered an inspection of Lim Eun-jung, head of the Gwangju Regional CIA, who had publicly criticized nominee Kim Ji-yong. On October 12, the CIA’s Inspection Office designated it the agency’s “first inspection” and began examining whether Lim’s remarks and conduct had violated the duties of political neutrality and maintaining proper conduct. A CIA official said the agency recognized that it was in an “emergency situation in the early days after opening” and was making preparations. The official said it was preparing its own manual and had also secured digital-forensics equipment transferred from the Public Prosecution Office.

## Authenticity Debate

The central issue is whether the CIA’s reliance on handwritten procedures and the fact that it has transferred no cases demonstrate that the system itself is not working, or whether they are temporary problems arising during the agency’s initial transition period.

### The View That It Is Effectively Idle

Those who take this view argue that both the figures and on-the-ground accounts point in the same direction. If the police have notified the CIA of 459 cases over nearly ten days and not one has been transferred, the system must have ground to a halt. The 82 complaints and accusations have been assigned, but investigations have not begun. The Korea Economic Daily and the Seoul Shinmun have also described the agency as “open but idle.”

Accounts from the field are more specific. Immigration records must be requested by official letter, investigators must pay search-and-seizure expenses out of pocket, and some investigators have not even received work computers. Can anyone expect investigations to proceed at a normal pace under these conditions? An investigator at the headquarters admitted that there was “hardly anything we can do.” With 16 of the 24 director-level positions vacant, the chain of command cannot be operating properly either. Handwritten processing will be unavoidable until the second phase of KICS launches in December, and building the CIA’s own KICS will take around three years. The projected resolution is too far off for this to be considered temporary confusion, they argue. The fact that the jurisdictional coordination committee will not begin operating until February next year has also raised concerns that jurisdictional confusion could arise in major cases, such as cyberattacks on financial institutions.

### The View That It Is Only a Transitional Problem

The opposing view argues that the figure “zero case transfers” should first be interpreted more carefully. According to Sisa Journal, the police said that notification to the CIA does not automatically mean a case is transferred: the police investigate until the transfer, and the CIA takes over afterward, so there can be no confusion over jurisdiction, cases being passed back and forth, or gaps in investigations. The 459 notifications show that the police are following the law, not that the cases are being neglected. Moreover, “zero transfers” refers to the situation as of October 8, while the notification total covers cases reported through October 10, making a direct comparison of the two figures difficult.

There is also a view that handwritten processing is a temporary measure during a system transition, not a permanent structural condition. The CIA is assigning incoming cases to departments for document review, preparing an internal manual, and has secured forensic equipment. According to Yonhap News, many members of the voice-phishing and narcotics investigation teams moved to the Seoul and Suwon CIAs and are continuing to review cases based on the status of existing investigations.

The two positions rely on evidence from different levels and are therefore difficult to resolve. Reports have not yet established the actual scale of handwritten processing or the extent of delays to investigations.

## Trivia

- Sources differ in how they describe the crimes under the CIA’s jurisdiction. The Korea Economic Daily and Yonhap News articles dated October 12 refer to “seven major crimes,” while a Yonhap News article dated October 11 refers to “six major crimes.” The list in the Korea Economic Daily article consists of corruption, economic crimes, defense-industry crimes, narcotics, national-security crimes, cybercrimes, and law-related distortions.
- Yonhap News published an article titled “The CIA’s first move was not an investigation but an inspection,” noting that its first official action was an inspection of Chief Lim Eun-jung rather than an investigation.
- Meanwhile, the Public Prosecution Office is in the midst of “erasing the Prosecution Service.” According to the Hankyoreh, the prosecution logo was removed from the glass doors of its buildings, and even the word “Prosecution” engraved on a manhole cover on the grounds of the Supreme Prosecutors’ Office was ground off. The Seoul Shinmun reported that the Ministry of Justice had allocated 6.5 billion won in reserve funds for removing logos and related work.

## Sources

- FM Korea post, [“The CIA after the abolition of the Prosecution Service”](https://m.fmkorea.com/best/10440318932)
- Korea Economic Daily, [“CIA Still Idle Ten Days After Opening… Police Notify It of 459 Cases, but Investigations Remain at ‘0’”](https://www.hankyung.com/article/2026101270161) (2026-10-12)
- Yonhap News, [“CIA Staff Still Unfamiliar with Their Work on Ninth Day After Launch: ‘Emergency Situation in the Early Days’ (Updated)”](https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20261011022651004?input=1195m) (2026-10-11)
- Seoul Shinmun, [“67% of Director-Level Posts Vacant, Immigration Records Also Unavailable… CIA ‘Open but Idle’”](https://www.seoul.co.kr/news/society/2026/10/12/20261012002001?wlog_tag3=naver) (2026-10-12)
- Yonhap News, [“CIA Marks Ten Days Since Launch… ‘Zero Cases’ Taken Over from Police”](https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20261012089100004?input=1195m) (2026-10-12)
- Sisa Journal, [“Police Notify CIA of 459 Cases but Transfer ‘Zero’… Jurisdiction over Financial-Sector Cyberattack Also Undecided”](https://www.sisajournal.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=389820) (2026-10-12)
- Hankyoreh, [“CIA Launch Marred by Late Notice of Work Locations and Failure to Build Communications Network”](https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/society_general/1280519.html) (2026-10-02)

## Verified facts

- The Prosecutors’ Office was abolished on October 2, 2026, and the Serious Crimes Investigation Agency (SCIA) and the Prosecution Service were launched. The amended Criminal Procedure Act took effect the same day, ending prosecutors’ authority to conduct direct investigations. (Common to reports by Hankyoreh, Hankyung, and Yonhap News Agency)
- From October 2 to 10, the National Police Agency referred 459 cases to the SCIA. By regional SCIA office, the figures were Seoul 205, Busan 99, Suwon 76, Daegu 38, Gwangju 25, and Daejeon 16. (Common to reports by Hankyung, Yonhap News Agency, and Sisa Journal, and the Hankyung article cited in the FM Korea post)
- The data were obtained from the National Police Agency by Kim Ye-ji of the People Power Party, a member of the National Assembly’s Public Administration and Security Committee, and released on the 12th. (Common to reports by Hankyung, Yonhap News Agency, and Sisa Journal)
- As of the 8th, the SCIA had requested that the police transfer no cases, and had received no transferred cases. (Reports by Hankyung, Yonhap News Agency, and Sisa Journal, and the FM Korea post)
- As of the 7th, regional SCIA offices had received 82 complaints and accusations. (Common to reports by Yonhap News Agency and Sisa Journal)
- Under the SCIA Act, other investigative agencies must immediately notify the head of the SCIA when they become aware of any of the seven major crimes within the SCIA’s investigative remit. If the SCIA requests a case be transferred, they must comply unless there is a valid reason not to. (Common to reports by Yonhap News Agency, Sisa Journal, and Hankyung)
- The SCIA has not been able to build its own Criminal Justice Information System (KICS) and is borrowing the police KICS. It can use only essential functions such as receiving, registering, and assigning transferred cases, so much of the work is handled manually. Building its own KICS is expected to take about three years. (Common to reports by Hankyoreh, Yonhap News Agency, Hankyung, and Seoul Shinmun)
- The SCIA launched with about 1,900 of its 2,874 authorized positions filled (66%). Of 24 division-chief positions at headquarters, 16 were vacant; seven of the eight director-general-level positions were filled, with only the inspector general position vacant. (Common to reports by Yonhap News Agency, Seoul Shinmun, and Hankyung. Hankyoreh reported that, as of the day before launch, 1,962 people had applied for special appointments, or about 68%.)
- At the Seoul SCIA, 11 of the 25 division-chief positions across six investigative bureaus are vacant. (Common to reports by Yonhap News Agency and Seoul Shinmun)
- Because the SCIA has no expenditure account in its name, investigators sometimes pay for supplies out of pocket and seek reimbursement afterward. (Common to reports by Yonhap News Agency and Seoul Shinmun)
- In connection with a series of AI-assisted cyberattacks on financial institutions, the police determined that the affected financial institutions themselves did not qualify as national critical infrastructure. They requested an authoritative interpretation from the Financial Services Commission to determine whether the compromised systems were electronic financial infrastructure, and the case had not yet been reported or transferred to the SCIA. (Common to reports by Yonhap News Agency and Sisa Journal)
- Interior and Safety Minister Yun Ho-jung ordered an investigation into Lim Eun-jeong, chief of the Gwangju SCIA, after she publicly criticized Kim Ji-yong, the nominee for the first SCIA chief, and the SCIA began the investigation. (Common to reports by Yonhap News Agency, Hankyung, and Seoul Shinmun)
- The SCIA had no chief when it launched. Kim Ji-yong was nominated on September 7, but the appointment process was delayed. (Common to reports by Hankyoreh and Yonhap News Agency)
- Following the abolition of the Prosecutors’ Office, joint investigative bodies, including the Seoul Eastern District Prosecutors’ Office’s joint task force on voice-phishing crimes, were disbanded or had personnel transferred to the SCIA. (Common to reports by Hankyoreh and Yonhap News Agency)

## Points of dispute

- The final item among the seven crimes under the SCIA’s investigative remit is rendered as “legal rights outside the law” in a screenshot of the Hankyung article cited in the FM Korea post, but as “crime of distorting the law” in the Hankyung web article. In another article, Yonhap News Agency referred to “six major crimes.”
- Regarding SCIA staffing, Hankyoreh reported that 1,962 people had applied for special appointments as of the day before launch (about 68%), while Yonhap News Agency and Hankyung reported that 1,900 people (66%) were actually in place at launch; the reference dates and figures differ.
- Yonhap News Agency described the period of police referrals as “nine days,” while Hankyung specified “October 2–10.” These refer to the same period, so there is no substantive conflict.